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This study aims at conceptualizing the different outcomes of inter-cognitive 
representations, such as manifestations of agreements between business actors, legally binding 
contracts, and industry standards and regulations which are developed through interactions 
between actors in business networks. Inter-cognitive representations inscribe shared 
understandings and thus prove an objectified basis for further interactions within the business 
network. To advance the study of inter-cognitive representations in business networks, we 
develop a conceptual framework that integrates two conceptual dimensions, namely, 1) 
‘shared understanding of rules’ and 2) ‘interaction among interdependent actors’. The 
framework allows us to formulate four theoretical propositions that provide alternative 
hypotheses, which deserve further research and empirical testing. 
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Inter-cognitive Representations in Business Networks 
 
“[E]epistemology [which] is concerned with the prospects of human knowledge must work 
hand in hand with cognitive science” (Goldman, 1999, p. 280).  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 This study conceptualizes the different outcomes of inter-cognitive representations 
which are developed through interaction between organizations. We use the term inter-
cognitive representations to describe organizational artefacts that inscribe shared 
understandings, such as manifestations of agreements between business actors, legally binding 
contracts, industry standards, and business regulations. Notwithstanding the well-rehearsed 
arguments on the relevance of cognitive representations (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Gavetti & 
Rivkin, 2007; Salvato, 2009) or managers’ subjective cognitive pictures (Corsaro & Snehota, 
2012; Ramos & Ford, 2001; Henneberg et al., 2006, 2010; Geiger & Finch, 2010; Leek & 
Mason, 2010; Ford et al., 2003) there is a paucity of discussion of the role of inter-cognitive 
representations developed through interaction practices between business partners (Öberg et 
al., 2012).  
The term representations means per se that an objectified artefact is a model and 
hence a reduction that is created to represent the complexity of business affairs. As Cooper 
(1992, p. 257) puts it: “[t]he affairs of the world are made pliable, wieldable and therefore 
amendable to human use through technologies of representations”. In a broader context, inter-
cognitive representations include diverse practices such as accounting rules, public 
procurement regulations, financial reporting, industrial classifications, and legislation. We 
also use the term business networks to describe webs of inter-related exchange relationships 
among organizations (Ford et al., 2003).  We thus employ the term network to move beyond 
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simple dyadic relationships to examine effects on indirect relationships (Håkansson & 
Snehota, 1989; Mouzas, 2006a). In such a business-to-business context, our attention is 
specifically focused on, first, the business interactions among interdependent actors, and 
secondly, shared rules that govern these business interactions and thus transcend any 
individual organizational action or individual managerial cognition.   
The present article is based on the following argument: Business interactions between 
organizations do not occur in a vacuum; interactions are based on shared understandings of 
the rules that guide actors’ behaviours; and the actors are affected by these rules. Shared 
understandings of rules can refer to a mutually perceived availability of exchange interfaces, 
trade practices and norms, or shared appreciations and values including explicit or implicit 
regulations and laws that govern business interactions. Consider in this context the relevance 
of good faith as a reasonable commercial standard of fair dealings. The threshold requirement 
of good faith is that each party must negotiate and perform the contract honestly. In case of a 
misrepresentation, where one counterpart has been induced to enter into a business contract as 
a result of a false statement of fact by the other party, the shared understanding of the 
interacting parties is that such misrepresentation can cause to rescind (set aside) that contract. 
Hence, each actors’ interpretation supposes a ‘shared understanding’, or what Heidegger 
(1966) described as prejudice. This shared understanding becomes a boundary object, i.e. a 
tangible or intangible manifestation of a shared understanding of the interaction characteristics 
in a business relationship (Star & Griesemer, 1989). Such boundary objects are defining 
common practices for partners in a business network (e.g. open-book accounting agreements 
and financial templates used between a manufacturer and its first-tier suppliers; Kajüter & 
Kulmala, 2005); they are being interpreted similarly by all sides involved in business 
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exchanges (i.e. the cognitive frames of actors are overlapping) and thereby provide 
organizational boundary-spanning manifestations of shared intent (Mason & Easton, 2009; 
Harrison et al., 2011).   
In this article, we argue that inter-cognitive representations inscribe shared 
understandings and thus prove an objectified basis for further interactions within the business 
network. Previous research (Johanson & Mattsson, 1992; Weick, 1993, 1995; Welch & 
Wilkinson, 2002; Ford et al., 2003; Henneberg et al., 2006, 2010) provides valuable insights 
about how individuals make sense of a network and how interactions work within it. For 
example, Henneberg et al. (2010 p. 356) make clear that “managers' cognitive representations 
of the network and its characteristics can be seen as embracing an individual's ‘frame of 
reference’,[…]. However, such sense-making happens via interacting with others, e.g. 
managers, customers, or other experts”. Recent research pushes this inquiry forward by 
providing empirical evidence of the emergent role of value representations in managing 
business relationships (Corsaro, 2014). Questions remain about the interplay between 
cognition, managerial action and outcomes in business networks and how the research based 
on managers’ ‘network pictures’ (Ford et al., 2003) can be developed to better understand 
collective decision-making and inter-action in business networks. For example, previous 
research on cognition and sense-making (see IMM, 2010, Special Issue, Sense-Making and 
Management in Business Networks) does not explain sufficiently the development of shared 
understandings in business networks. Such research remains routed in individual cognition, 
i.e. managers’ subjective cognitive views and does not consider the creation of a ‘collective 
mind’ in, as well as between, organizations (Weick & Roberts, 1993). There is thus a need for 
improved clarity and for a stronger integration of research advances from related disciplines 
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such as psychology, economics and strategy with existing conceptualisations of business-to-
business marketing. What are the determinants of inter-cognitive representations? What are 
the implications of inter-cognitive representations on interaction in business networks? While 
our argument does not relate to the process of creating a shared, inter-cognitive understanding, 
or to the relationship between individual network pictures on the one hand, and inter-cognitive 
representations on the other, our reasoning is aimed at conceptualizing the different outcomes 
of such inter-cognitive, shared understanding. The evidence hitherto is that business managers 
face tremendous difficulties in integrating disperse pieces of individual cognitive views held 
by various actors in their surrounding business networks (Mouzas et al., 2008). There exists a 
lack of theoretical discussion regarding the role of shared understandings in business 
networks. This theoretical deficiency has prevented researchers from investigating the 
outcomes of the amalgamation of individual perceptions into inter-cognitive representations, 
which is a pre-condition to getting to grips with collective decision-making and interaction in 
business networks, such as networking decisions regarding influencing the network position of 
a firm (Ford et al., 2003; Ford & Mouzas, 2010, 2013).    
As inter-cognitive representations are created through recurrent interactions among 
actors embedded in networks of exchange relationships, they differ from individual cognitive 
representations (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) or individual managers’ network pictures 
(Henneberg et al., 2006, 2010).  In other words, inter-cognitive representations express the 
knowledge individual actors have about other actors’ knowledge, which is based on 
interactions between these actors. For this reason, the efficacy of inter-cognitive 
representations will depend on their prominence or salience (Mehta, Starmer & Sudgen, 
1994). Prominent or salient bearings of what is expected from actors can be found in almost 
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every part of organizational life. Vivid examples are industry standards or explicit regulations 
within certain industries. Organizations, such as the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI), the British Standards Institute (BSI), Deutsches Institut für Normung (DIN), or the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), develop inter-cognitive representations 
of many kinds. For example, ISO 9000 certifications comprise internationally agreed 
standards of managing a corporation to gain the confidence of customers and other business 
partners in networks.  
Using further practical examples, we illustrate how prominent objectified artefacts 
such as manifestations of agreements, contracts, industry standards and regulations affect 
business relationships in networks. Our aim is to provide a theoretical foundation that will 
enable us to investigate and analyse inter-cognitive representations. For this reason, we 
propose a conceptual framework for the analysis of objectified artefacts that contributes to the 
literature on cognitive representations through an inter-cognitive perspective, i.e. a shared 
inter-organizational and objectified perspective. In this way, the present study answers calls 
for more research on the amalgamation of individual cognitive approaches to business 
network representations, both within a firm (i.e. between individual managers; Öberg et al., 
2012) and between firms (Henneberg et al., 2010). 
The article is organized as follows: An initial discussion of the shared understanding of 
rules will be followed by an outline of the interactions within business networks. Based on 
this review, a conceptual framework of inter-cognitive representations is developed, and its 
theoretical implications are discussed via positing propositions. Managerial implications as 




2. A SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF RULES 
In developing a network perspective on rules encountered in business relationships, a 
study of the constitution of networks (Mouzas & Ford, 2009) invites us to an imaginative 
world in which raw material suppliers, manufacturers, equipment suppliers, logistics 
companies, wholesalers, and retailers would buy and sell goods and services without reliance 
on any shared system of rules. In this imaginary world there would be no manifestations of 
business agreements, no legally binding contracts; no industry standards, rules and no 
regulations regarding fair trade, quality controls, predefined patterns of advertising and 
promotions, or specified interfaces for logistics. As a result, actors would lack a shared or 
inter-cognitive understanding of rules, no one would conform to a particular pattern of 
behavior; and no one would expect other actors to conform to some previously learned pattern 
(Lewis, 1967; Young, 1993). What would be the problem in this imaginative world? 
According to Mouzas & Ford (2009), the problem would not simply be the existence of 
anarchy, but rather the inherent difficulty for actors of interacting with each other; thereby, 
the possibility of exchange between actors would be severely constrained (Buchanan, 1975, 
1988, 1988; Biggart & Delbridge, 2004).   
In this imaginative world of a business network in which no rules are shared among 
actors, resources that are needed may not be identified by buying or selling firms (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Thus, firms would face “prohibitive costs in terms of the time and effort 
needed to access other actors, to negotiate the terms for interaction, to conclude and manifest 
deals and to oversee and enforce agreements” (Mouzas & Ford, 2009, p. 495). In the absence 
of a shared system of rules among actors, information asymmetry and symmetric ignorance of 
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business opportunities would prevent actors from deal-making and building up the business 
relationships on which their companies depend (Ford & Håkansson, 2006).   
 The existence of shared rules is, therefore, important for the functioning of business 
networks. Shared rules have been evident in trade from the earliest times, and research has 
provided significant insight into their relevance as the institutional structure of business life 
(Buchanan, 1975, 1988; Loasby, 2000; North, 1990; Nee, 1998; Loasby, 2000). Extant 
research raises questions about the real-life nature of rules and the dialectic relation between 
the structural make-up of rules and the interactions among actors embedded in networks of 
business relationships. We know, for example, very little about how companies interact with 
each other; and we lack insights into how the multiplicity of rules is manifested in business 
relationships.  
Previous research (Esser, 1956; Dworkin, 1967; Ayres & Gertner, 1989; Riley, 2000) 
suggests that the traditional distinction between ius strictum (i.e. mandatory rules) and ius 
dispositivum (i.e. yielding rules) that has existed since Roman times is still valid today. This 
theoretical differentiation corresponds to the contemporary distinction between mandatory and 
default rules (Ayres & Gertner, 1989; Riley, 2000). In a similar way, Esser (1956) 
differentiates between ‘Rule’ (Norm) and ‘Principle’ (Grundsatz). The unifying idea of 
previous research is that continuous replication of existing interaction patterns by interacting 
counterparts can lead to the development of principles which operate as ‘optimization 
commands’ over time (Dworkin, 1967), and thus adopt the characteristic of network rules of 
conduct. Such rules and principles may, therefore, limit the types of relationships in which the 
businesses are able to participate (Håkansson & Ford, 2002; Mouzas & Ford, 2009).  
9 
 
A shared understanding of rules increases the ‘predictability’ of group members’ 
behavior and gives expression to a business network’s ‘central values’ (Feldman, 1984). 
Sharing of rules decreases uncertainties and risk, and allows for the development of a ‘theory 
of mind’ by actors (i.e. the ability to understand and anticipate other actors’ mindset and 
considerations; Eisenberg, 2006), which takes expectations about reasonable behaviors by 
relationship partners within the business network into account (Hallen et al., 1991). However, 
such shared understanding of rules does not come into existence because actors recognize it as 
a rationally constructed condition. As Hayek described, shared rules evolve because groups of 
actors that “practiced them were more successful” (1973, p. 18). Thus, a shared understanding 
of rules evolved through interactions and ensures behavioral regularities, which sustain 
themselves (i.e. they become self-governing mechanisms), as they serve the interests of the 
actors involved in business networks. Consequently, a shared understanding of rules refers to 
the ‘rules of the game’ or the devised constraints that evolved through and shape human 
interaction, whether political, social, or economic (Lewis, 1967; North, 1990). 
 
3. INTERACTION AMONG INTERDEPENDENT ACTORS 
Valuable resources that are necessary for individual actors to solve their problems are 
widely dispersed across many different actors within the business network, and often within 
different business networks (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This dispersion of resources creates 
strong dependencies between organizations at a time of rapid technological change and global 
competition for customers and business growth. Therefore, strong interdependencies lead to 
formidable uncertainties for individual actors and a high degree of unpredictability (Duncan, 
1972; Downey et al., 1975; Milliken, 1987). Individual actors can only activate the resources 
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they need through interaction within their exchange relationships with others (Barney, 1986; 
Denrell et al., 2003; Zaefarian et al., 2011). This is particularly relevant because a significant 
number of business activities occur through strategic alliances, partnerships, R&D 
collaborations, and many other forms of continuing supplier and customer relationships 
(Smith Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).  
In this way, interaction among interdependent actors represents an opportunity for the 
counterparts to explore heterogeneity in their respective networks (Håkansson et al., 2007, 
2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). It appears that interaction between organizations transcends 
inter-personal discussion or communication. Interaction is a substantive process that involves 
the activities and resources of the involved actors (Håkansson et al., 2009). In this substantive 
process, exchange (in the narrow sense of transferring resources) can be seen as a possibility 
and a primary element of socio-economic activity (McGinn & Keros 2002; Biggart & 
Delbridge 2004; Buckley, 2005). In this way, exchange refers to actors’ “voluntary agreement 
involving the offer of any sort of present, continuing, or future utility in exchange for utilities 
of any sort offered in return” (Weber, 1978, p. 72-73). Consent is, ultimately, the moral 
component that differentiates between valid and invalid exchanges among individual actors 
(Barnett, 1986; Markovits, 2004). Therefore, understanding the role of exchange requires a 
fundamental insight of the ways by which individual actors intentionally seek to represent the 
creation and appropriation of joint gains (Lepak et al., 2007; Corsaro, 2014). Joint gains are 
achieved through a negotiation process of ‘wise trades’ (Bazerman et al., 2001) among actors 
who have the ability to see the broader picture and the connectedness of activities and 
resources between organizations. However, such ‘wise trade’ requires a shift in actors’ self-
perception from ‘self as independent’ to ‘self as part’ of a larger whole (Bigelow, 1992), i.e. 
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as an actor within an interdependent business relationship. Developing a better understanding 
of ‘wise trades’ requires more research into the role of entitlements or property rights that 
specify the substance of rights that individual actors may possess, acquire, or transfer in their 
interactions with other actors (Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1966; Barnett, 1986).   
Similarly, our understanding of the substance of business interaction is still limited. 
Perhaps this is attributed to our propensity to focus our attention on structural elements of 
business networks and relationships and hence to neglect the behavioural and cognitive 
aspects (Henneberg et al., 2010). Therefore, investigating interaction among interdependent 
actors may serve as a means to move on to a higher aggregation level, from atomistic 
cognition and individual action (of managers or firms) to shared understandings and collective 
action (within networks of business relationships). Through interaction over time, resources 
dispersed in business networks will co-evolve, thereby, enabling dyadic exchange 
relationships to be connected with other business relationships that give access to other more 
distant networks of relationships. The connectivity outcomes of interaction are evidenced, for 
example, in the global networks of financial institutions. Financial networks, which involve 
investment banks, retail banks, for-profit companies, rating agencies, and private households, 
exhibit high connectivity among the interacting actors despite the existence of conditions of 
information asymmetry and unforeseen contingencies. 
Understanding interactions between interdependent actors is thus linked to getting to 
grips with the underlying shared rules, and the representations that manifest (or objectify) 
these rules. There exists a lack of research in business and network studies on such inter-
cognitive outcomes. An exception is research on the ‘cognitive strategic group’ literature 
(Langfeld-Smith, 1992; Reger & Huff, 1993). However, this strand of research is mainly 
12 
 
focussing on issues of competition, i.e. relates to the layer of companies that perceive 
themselves to exhibit similar network positions and network roles (Abrahamsen et al., 2012). 
A theoretical framework for understanding inter-cognitive representations, in contrast, needs 
to take into account manifold business relationships in the wider business networks. The 
following will develop such a framework and derive certain theoretical propositions based on 
this framework. 
 
4.  A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: CONSTRUCTS AND DEFINITIONS 
The relevant theoretical input from the two aspects of the ‘shared understanding of 
rules’ on the one hand, and ‘interaction among interdependent actors’ on the other hand are 
now used to define the theoretical constructs in our attempt to move towards a framework of 
inter-cognitive representations  (see Figure 1). The framework will enable us to distinguish 
different categories (or contingencies) of inter-cognitive representations, which are used to 
develop theoretical propositions. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
--------------------------------- 
Inter-cognitive representations are shaped by a) rules and b) interactions at different 
levels. Rules in the context of our framework constitute a system of conventions that become 
common among actors (Lewis, 1967; Young, 1993). While some of the rules are strict and 
mandatory, such as legally binding contracts or explicit regulations within an industry; other 
rules, such as manifestations of consent or industry standards, may be yielding or merely 
default (Ayres & Gertner, 1989; Riley, 2000). Legally binding contracts comprise mandatory 
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rules that are created through dyadic interaction between business partners. In contrast, 
explicit regulations are the accumulated effect of network interactions among multiple actors 
and may be imposed upon them. Interactions refer to substantive processes by which 
counterparts relate to each other. Undoubtedly, many business interactions are at dyadic level, 
for example, dyadic interactions happen within business relationships, such as those between a 
manufacturer and a key first-tier supplier. However, each dyadic relationship in which an 
individual actor partakes will be connected with other dyadic relationships (Håkansson & 
Snehota, 1989; Parolini, 1999), this will form a structure of network interactions that affects 
other more distant network areas as well as other networks (Håkansson & Waluszewski 2002; 
Håkansson et al., 2007, 2009). In this way, the term network interaction is used to transcend 
the notion of dyadic interaction by incorporating the effects of business relationships on 
further interactions outside the focal dyad.  
The utility of the proposed framework of inter-cognitive representations presented in 
Figure 1 is that it allows us to explore four different contingencies: 1) manifestations of 
consent that are created through dyadic interaction based on default rules, 2) legally binding 
contracts that are created through dyadic interaction, but are based on mandatory rules which 
are strict rules and thus legally enforceable, 3) industry standards that are created through 
network interactions based on default rules, and 4) explicit regulations, e.g. legislation or 
statutory requirements, that are created through network interaction and constitute mandatory 
rules applicable to all actors. In the following section, we formulate propositions that link the 
defined constructs with each other and develop arguments that justify our propositions.     
 
5. THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
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Following our conceptual framework, we formulate four theoretical propositions, one 
for each resulting contingency. These propositions are meant to direct further research as they 
represent new perspectives on the interplay between cognition, inter-action and outcomes in 
business networks. They also provide alternative hypotheses that need empirical investigation 
and verification.  
  
Proposition 1:  Manifestations of consent form a baseline of default rules in dyadic 
interactions. 
Default rules articulate a common-sense order of shared conventions (Young, 1993; 
Choi, 1993). They express customary, expected, often non-legal rules that have been 
previously agreed and manifested in dyadic interactions among actors (Ayres & Gertner, 
1989; Riley, 2000).  How is this ‘common-sense order’ being formed? Much can be gained by 
investigating the effect of real-life manifestations of consent e.g. protocols, e-mails, 
memoranda of understandings or agreements in principle on the formation of default rules 
over time and assess their effect on business relationships. The evidence hitherto suggests that 
default rules apply a logic of ‘unless otherwise agreed’ (Barnett, 1992a), as they operate on 
bases of pre-existing agreements (Mouzas & Furmston, 2008; Mouzas & Blois, 2013). 
Nonetheless, our understanding of the dynamic link between manifestations of consent and the 
formation of default rules in dyadic interactions is still limited. 
 
Proposition 2: Legally binding contracts override default rules by creating mandatory 
rules for the contracting parties.  
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Mandatory rules are strict and applicable to all contracting parties. They can relate to 
contractual agreements about delivery times between supplier and customer, or to offering 
characteristics. Such legally binding contracts represent the most common boundary object in 
business relationships. Nonetheless, although mandatory, such rules are not unambiguous, as 
disputes about the interpretation of agreed contract terms are one of the largest sources of 
contractual litigation. The evidence hitherto is that in the case of a dispute, a neutral judge, 
arbitrator or mediator will decide the case adopting the contract as an external standard to 
expresses the reasonable expectations of parties as they are manifested in the contractual 
agreement (Steyn, 1997). Contracts, however, may build upon understandings that pre-exist as 
common practice in a particular context and transform them into a framework for managing 
business relationships (Macneil, 2000; Mouzas, 2006b). For example, as part of a continuing, 
long-term business relationship, certain delivery patterns may have come to be reasonably 
expected by partners, and, therefore, they can transform a default rule into a mandatory one 
over time. Much can be gained by investigating how contracts in long-term relationships 
create mandatory rules and assess the effect of mandatory rules on the developmental process 
of collaborative inter-firm relationships (Smith Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). 
 
Proposition 3: Industry standards form a baseline of default rules shared by network 
members. 
Industry standards transcend any individual actor or business relationship; they involve 
customary and expected modalities of interfaces and interactions in networks of business 
relationships. Brunsson & Jacobsson (2000) differentiate between three kinds of standards: a) 
standards about being something (e.g. what constitutes ‘profit’), b) standards for what we 
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should do, e.g. ‘standard operating procedures’, and c) standards for what we should have, e.g. 
insurance, plans, qualifications, quality systems etc. As such, industry standards represent 
codified default rules shared by most if not all members of a business network about aspects 
which often relate to crucial and foundational aspects of business systems. Nonetheless, 
default rules evolve and thus redefine industry standards (Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2000); we 
thus need more empirical insights about the dialectic link between industry standards and 
default rules in business networks. 
    
Proposition 4: Explicit regulations transform pre-existing default rules into mandatory 
rules that apply to all network members. 
Mandatory rules applicable to all network members can be found in statute law, for 
example, in business law. Many business relationships, such as those between retailers and 
final consumers, employment contracts, or financial and credit contracts nowadays are not 
regulated by default rules; they are regulated by explicit regulations, e.g. statutes which do not 
always conform to individual business-to-business relationship agreements or practices.  The 
increasing importance of codified regulations, as well as the growing importance of statutes, 
cannot be overlooked. In today’s business landscape, such codified regulations may include 
self-regulatory agreements, such as rules about advertising decency, which become quasi-law 
for an industry and are adjudicated by an independent body. Similarly, we cannot neglect the 
importance of international regulations that transform pre-existing default rules into 
mandatory rules, such as a) the provisions in the Convention on International Sale of Goods 
(the Vienna Convention), b) the United States’ Uniform Commercial Code and Restatement 




6. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS  
This research conceptualized different outcomes of inter-cognitive representations in 
business networks. The range of inter-cognitive representations is virtually endless. Most 
obvious examples are manifestations of agreements between business actors, legally binding 
contracts, industry standards or business regulations that are created and shared through an on-
going dyadic as well as network interactions. We have demonstrated that these outcomes of 
inter-cognitive representations differ from individual cognitive representations frequently 
discussed in business marketing (Ford et al., 2003; Henneberg et al., 2006, 2010) and 
management studies (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Gavetti & Rivkin, 2007; Salvato, 2009). 
Managers need to understand the difference between cognitive representations found in 
individual presentations, speeches, letters or value propositions in key account programs 
(Henneberg et al., 2005, 2009), and inter-cognitive representations that manifest a shared 
understanding, either in business relationships or beyond (Öberg et al., 2012). Managers need 
to be aware that the process of developing inter-cognitive representations does not occur 
automatically but can, and arguably needs to be guided carefully to develop a shared 
understanding. The four theoretical propositions presented in this study demonstrate this. As 
such, inter-cognitive representations are not just ‘coming about’ as a by-product of 
interactions, but they are also outcomes of managerial decisions regarding how they come 
about, and what content they contain (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). Managers and management 
teams could carry, champion, and mediate the following guiding principles: 
Transcend individual cognition: Individual cognition based on previous knowledge is 
potentially an inherent trap that can be avoided. For example, managers’ cognition may 
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contain biases and errors of judgement (Kahneman, 1992; Kahneman  & Frederick, 2002; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1983). How can managers 
challenge their individual ‘prejudices’?  Managers’ assumptions need to be tested and 
improved through several layers of heedful interactions and exchanges with different actors 
(Weick & Roberts, 1993). This will ensure that managerial cognition does not exclude other 
rationales, motivations, and restrictions, which are not individually held and which might be 
important for other actors and firms. 
Inscribe shared understandings: The inscription of shared understandings in 
organizational artefacts requires a continuous effort to define the rules that govern interaction 
with other actors. One way to approach this task is to consider objectified artefacts as work-in-
progress or as a recurrent practice of inscribing periodical business reviews, negotiation 
episodes, and manifestations of agreements (Öberg et al., 2012). Inter-cognitive 
representations need to become objectified outcomes in form of shared data and shared 
information so that they can be used practically to foster a shared meaning. Dyadic decisions, 
such as open-book agreements between supplier and buyer firm, can facilitate such 
endeavours. 
Safeguard against myopia:  The achievement of a shared understanding constitutes 
powerful mechanisms of influence; nonetheless, it may potentially result in myopic herd 
behaviour. Managers need to be aware that herd behaviour in business networks can be 
brought about when actors are influenced by other actors and this influence is leading to a 
great number of actors sharing understandings and acting alike (Mouzas & Ford, 2012). If 
whole networks share a myopic perspective, i.e. create a ‘cognitive community’ without actors 
being able to challenge some ‘certainties’ as they become enshrined in industry standards or 
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even explicit regulations, this can have detrimental effects especially in cases of external 
turbulence (Porac et al., 1989). 
Following these guiding principles, managers’ effort to deal with inter-cognitive 
representations becomes a way of life. It is an indeterminate managerial effort of constructing 
and inscribing a shared understanding of default and strict rules through multilateral dyadic 
but also network interactions.  
 
7.  FUTURE RESEARCH 
The present study conceptualized the outcomes of inter-cognitive representations on 
the basis of a 1) ‘shared understanding of rules’ and 2) ‘interaction among interdependent 
actors’. The framework allowed us to formulate four theoretical propositions that deserve 
further research and empirical testing. Given the inherent lack of attention to the relevance of 
inter-cognitive representations and the managerial challenge of achieving outcomes of shared 
understandings, future research could move on from the study of subjective cognitive views 
(e.g. network pictures) to an investigation of objectified outcomes shared by other actors, e.g. 
the creation or change of boundary objects in business relationships, or the evolution of 
regulatory norms for business networks. To advance the study of inter-cognitive 
representations, researchers could utilize the conceptual dimensions of a) ‘shared 
understanding of rules’ and b) ‘interaction among interdependent actors’ and examine the 
theoretical constructs and contingencies presented in the proposed theoretical framework (see 
Figure 1). This examination could also include the interactions between different outcomes of 
inter-cognitive representations, e.g. how industry standards for business networks may relate 
to the specifics of contracts in dyadic relationships (Meindl et al., 1994).  
20 
 
The study of inter-cognitive representations in business networks is now more relevant 
than ever for three reasons: First, a great deal of business activity nowadays occurs through 
various forms of alliances, partnerships and collaborations in multiple business relationships 
(Smith Ring & Van de Ven, 1994) but we know very little about the ‘collective mind’ in the 
business landscape (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Secondly, the interplay between individual 
cognition, e.g. managers’ network pictures, and the different outcomes of inter-cognitive 
representations needs to be understood as an integrative part of interactions between actors 
(Henneberg et al., 2010). Understanding these interactions will help to create a better shared 
understanding of managerial options within business relationships and wider business 
networks, i.e. it fosters objectified outcomes or what has been termed ‘network insight’ 
(Mouzas et al., 2008). Thirdly, research on inter-cognitive representations will help us 
understand, explain, and predict the institutional structure of rules that govern interaction in 
business networks (Buchanan, 1988; North, 1990; Nee, 1998; Khalil, 1995; Loasby, 2000). 
Mandatory rules, for example, may be imposed on actors, thus, they may reshape interactions 
among actors (Rindt and Mouzas, 2015). There is a long and fruitful way to go. The present 
study on inter-cognitive representations in business networks has, hopefully, provided a 
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Figure 1: Inter-Cognitive Representations
